Refereed Articles
Inference to the Best Explanation as a Form of Non-Deductive Reasoning in Mathematics
Philosophia Mathematica,
(2025).
vol. 33, pp. 36-68.
Can Pragmatic Humeanism Account for the Counterfactual Invariance of Natural Laws?
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
(2025).
Forthcoming.
[Article]
Inference to the Best Explanation as a Form of Non-Deductive Reasoning in Mathematics
Philosophia Mathematica,
(2025).
Forthcoming.
[Article]
Reichenbach’s Lecture ‘The Problem of Laws of Nature’
Erkenntnis 90,
(2025).
pp. 505-516.
[Article]
The Necessity of Accidents
with Chris Dorst,
The Journal of Philosophy,
(2025).
Forthcoming.
[Article]
Defending ‘Distinctively Mathematical’ Scientific Explanations
Philosophy of Science,
(2025).
Forthcoming.
Laws of Nature, Metaphysics, and Science Education: A Reply to Scerri
Foundations of Chemistry,
(2025).
Forthcoming.
[Article]
What are Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics and How Can They Contribute to Teaching and Learning?
Journal of Mathematical Behavior 76,
(2024).
article #101191.
[Article]
[PDF]
A False Dichotomy in Denying Explanatoriness Any Role in Confirmation
Noûs 58,
(2024).
pp. 520–535.
[Article]
[PDF]
Jeffrey Conditionalization Permits Undermining
Journal of Philosophical Logic 53,
(2024).
pp. 585–591.
[Article]
Why is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge?
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102:2,
(2024).
pp. 333–353.
[Article]
Explanation by Constraint: Not Just in Physics
International Journal in the Philosophy of Science 36,
(2023).
pp. 265–277.
[Article]
[PDF]
A New Circularity in Explanations by Humean Laws of Nature
Philosophical Studies 180,
(2023).
pp. 1001–1016.
[Article]
[PDF]
More on Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make: A Reply to Wildman
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 54,
(2023).
pp. 325–329.
[Article]
In Defense of Really Statistical Explanations
Synthese 200:5,
(2022).
article #388, 15 pp..
[Article]
[PDF]
Inference to the Best Explanation as Supporting the Expansion of Mathematicians’ Ontological Commitments
Synthese 200:2,
(2022).
article number 146, 26 pp..
[Article]
[PDF]
How to Make the World Safe for Autonomy; or, How to Fodor-Kitcher an Albert-Loewer
in Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.),
Rethinking the Concept of Law of Nature: Natural Order in the Light of Contemporary Science,
Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science, Cham, Switzerland: Springer,
(2022).
pp. 65–88.
[Article]
[PDF]
Against Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Quality
Philosophy of Science 89,
(2022).
pp. 252–267.
[Article]
[PDF]
Inference to the Best Explanation is an Important Form of Reasoning in Mathematics
The Mathematical Intelligencer 44,
(2022).
pp. 32–38.
[Article]
Putting Explanation Back Into ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’
Noûs 56,
(2022).
pp. 84–109.
Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, volume XL.
[Article]
[PDF]
Challenges Facing Counterfactual Accounts of Explanation in Mathematics
Philosophia Mathematica 30,
(2022).
pp. 32–58.
[Article]
Running it up the Flagpole to see if Anyone Salutes: A Response to Woodward on Causal and Explanatory Asymmetries
with Katie Elliott,
Theoria 31/1,
(2022).
pp. 53–62.
[Article]
[PDF]
What Could Mathematics Be for It to Function in Distinctively Mathematical Scientific Explanations?
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 87,
(2021).
pp. 44–53.
[Article]
Asymmetry as a Challenge to Counterfactual Accounts of Non-Causal Explanation
Synthese 198,
(2021).
pp. 3893–3918.
[Article]
[PDF]
Fragmentalism and Special Relativity
with Thomas Hofweber,
Teorema 39/3,
(2020).
pp. 5–15.
[Article]
What Inference to the Best Explanation is Not: A Reply to Roche and Sober’s Screening-Off Challenge to IBE
Teorema 39/2,
(2020).
pp. 27–42.
[Article]
[PDF]
The Principle of Virtual Work, Counterfactuals, and the Avoidance of Physics
European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9:3,
(2019).
pp. 1–21.
[Article]
Ground and Explanation in Mathematics
Philosophers’ Imprint 19.33,
(2019).
pp. 1–18.
[Article]
[PDF]
Are There both Causal and Non-Causal Explanations of a Rocket’s Acceleration?
Perspectives on Science 27:1,
(2019).
pp. 7–25.
[Article]
[PDF]
What Would Normative Necessity Be?
The Journal of Philosophy 115.4,
(2018).
pp. 169–186.
[Article]
Mathematical Explanations That Are Not Proofs
Erkenntnis 83,
(2018).
pp. 1285–1302.
[Article]
[PDF]
A Reply to Craver and Povich on the Directionality of Distinctively Mathematical Explanations
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 67,
(2018).
pp. 85–88.
[Article]
Transitivity, Self-Explanation, and the Explanatory Circularity Argument against Humean Accounts of Natural Law
Synthese 195.3,
(2018).
pp. 1337–1353.
[Article]
[PDF]
The Evidential Relevance of Explanatoriness: A Reply to Roche and Sober
Analysis 77.2,
(2017).
pp. 303–312.
[Article]
Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle? (No.)
The Monist, 100.3,
(2017).
pp. 422–436.
[Article]
[PDF]
Fine’s Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity
with Thomas Hofweber,
Noûs, 51,
(2017).
pp. 871–883.
This paper gives me an Erdös number of 4.
[Article]
Explanatory Proofs and Beautiful Proofs
Journal of Humanistic Mathematics 6,
(2016).
pp. 8–51.
Lead article in special issue on the nature and experience of mathematical beauty.
[Article]
Explanation, Existence, and Natural Properties in Mathematics – A Case Study: Desargues’ Theorem
Dialectica, 69.4,
(2015).
pp. 435–472.
Winner of the 2014 Dialectica prize competition on explanation in science and philosophy.
[Article]
[PDF]
Depth and Explanation in Mathematics
Philosophia Mathematica 23,
(2015).
pp. 196–214.
[Article]
[PDF]
On ‘Minimal Model Explanations’: A Reply to Batterman and Rice
Philosophy of Science 82,
(2015).
pp. 292–305.
[Article]
Aspects of Mathematical Explanation: Symmetry, Unity, and Salience
Philosophical Review, 123.4,
(2014).
pp. 485–531.
[Article]
[PDF]
Did Einstein Really Believe that Principle Theories are Explanatorily Powerless?
Perspectives on Science 22:4,
(2014).
pp. 449–463.
[Article]
[PDF]
How Simplicity Can Be A Virtue in Philosophical Theory-Choice
Erkenntnis 89:3,
(2014).
pp. 1217–1234.
[Article]
[PDF]
What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64,
(2013).
pp. 485–511.
Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, volume XXXIII.
[Article]
[PDF]
Really Statistical Explanations and Genetic Drift
Philosophy of Science 80,
(2013).
pp. 169–188.
[Article]
[PDF]
Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws
Philosophical Studies 164,
(2013).
pp. 255–261.
[Article]
Conservation Laws in Scientific Explanations: Constraints or Coincidences?
(2011).
[Article]
[PDF]
Can There Be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection
with Alexander Rosenberg,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89,
(2011).
pp. 591–599.
[Article]
Why Do Forces Add Vectorially? A Forgotten Controversy in the Foundations of ClassicalMechanics
American Journal of Physics 79,
(2011).
pp. 380–388.
[Article]
[PDF]
Meta-Laws of Nature and the Best System Account
Analysis 71,
(2011).
pp. 216-222.
[Article]
What are Mathematical Coincidences (and Why Does It Matter)?
Mind 119,
(2010).
pp. 307–340.
[Article]
[PDF]
A Tale of Two Vectors
Dialectica 63,
(2009).
special issue on the metaphysics of vectors, pp. 397–431.
Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, volume XXIX.
[Article]
[PDF]
Dimensional Explanations
Noûs 43,
(2009).
pp. 742–775.
[Article]
[PDF]
Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics Be Complete?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78,
(2009).
pp. 312–345.
[Article]
[PDF]
Why Proofs by Mathematical Induction are Generally Not Explanatory
Analysis 69,
(2009).
pp. 203–211.
[Article]
[PDF]
Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make
Analysis 68,
(2008).
pp. 120–128.
[Article]
[PDF]
Could the Laws of Nature Change?
Philosophy of Science 75,
(2008).
pp. 69–92.
[Article]
[PDF]
Laws and Meta-Laws of Nature
The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15,
(2007).
pp. 21–36.
[Article]
Laws and Meta-Laws of Nature: Conservation Laws and Symmetries
Studies in History andPhilosophy of Modern Physics 38,
(2007).
pp. 457–81.
[Article]
The End of Diseases
Philosophical Topics, 35,
(2007).
special issue on metaphysics and natural kinds, pp. 265–292.
[Article]
[PDF]
How to Account for the Relation Between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws
Mind 115,
(2006).
pp. 917–946.
[Article]
Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under The Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities?
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006), pp. 383–403,
(2006).
[Article]
How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill Its Causal Role?
Philosophical Review 114,
(2005).
pp.433–468.
[Article]
[PDF]
Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on Essentialism, Laws, and Counterfactuals
AustralasianJournal of Philosophy 83,
(2005).
pp. 581–588.
[Article]
A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity
PhilosophicalStudies 125,
(2005).
pp. 277–303.
[Article]
[PDF]
Ecological Laws: What Would They Be and Why Would They Matter?
Oikos [The Journal ofthe Nordic Ecological Society] 110,
(2005).
pp. 394–403.
[Article]
[PDF]
Laws and Their Stability
Synthese 144,
(2005).
pp. 415–432.
[Article]
A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82,
(2004).
pp. 227–241.
[Article]
Would Direct Realism Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
Noûs 38,
(2004).
pp. 197–232.
[Article]
Bayesianism and Unification: A Reply to Wayne Myrvold
Philosophy of Science 71,
(2004).
pp. 205–215.
[Article]
The Autonomy of Functional Biology: A Reply to Rosenberg
Biology & Philosophy, 19,
(2004).
pp. 93–101.
[Article]
Who’s Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them
Erkenntnis 57,
(2003).
pp. 407–423.
Reprinted in Philosophy of Science: An Anthology, Blackwell, 2007. reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, volume XXV. reprinted in Ceteris paribus Laws, ed. J. Earman, C. Glymour, and S. Mitchell (Kluwer, 2003).
[Article]
[PDF]
Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions, and the Turnover Fallacy
Analysis 62,
(2002).
pp. 281–285.
[Article]
[PDF]
Okasha on Inductive Scepticism
The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 207,
(2002).
pp. 226–232.
[Article]
The Apparent Superiority of Prediction To Accommodation as a Side Effect: A Reply to Maher
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52,
(2001).
pp. 575–588.
[Article]
The Most Famous Equation
The Journal of Philosophy 98: 5,
(2001).
pp. 219–238.
[Article]
[PDF]
Is Jeffrey Conditionalization Defective By Virtue of Being Non-Commutative? Remarks on theSameness of Sensory Experience
Synthese 123:3,
(2000).
pp. 393–403.
[Article]
Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars’s Scientific Realism, McDowell’s MoralRealism, and the Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical Studies, 101,
(2000).
pp. 213–251.
[Article]
Why Are the Laws of Nature So Important to Science?
Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch LIX: 3,
(1999).
pp. 625–652.
Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization
The Journal ofPhilosophy XCVI: 6,
(1999).
pp. 294-324.
[Article]
Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Lawhood
Philosophy of Science 66,
(1999).
pp. 243–267.
[Article]
Inductive Confirmation, Counterfactual Conditionals, and Laws of Nature
Philosophical Studies, 85, #1,
(1997).
pp. 1–36.
[Article]
Laws of Nature, Cosmic Coincidences, and Scientific Realism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, #4,
(1996).
pp. 614–638.
[Article]
Life, Artificial Life, and Scientific Explanation
Philosophy of Science 63,
(1996).
pp. 225–244.
Reprinted in Mark Bedau and Carol Cleland (eds.), The Nature of Life: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 236-48.
[Article]
Spearman’s Principle
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46,
(1995).
pp. 503–521.
[Article]
Are There Natural Laws concerning Particular Biological Species?
The Journal of Philosophy XCII: 8,
(1995).
pp. 430–451.
[Article]
Dispositions and Scientific Explanation
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75:2,
(1994).
pp. 108–132.
[Article]
Earman on the Projectibility of Grue
D. Hull, M. Forbes (ed.), and R. Burian,
PSA 1994 [Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association],
(1994).
volume 1, pp. 87–95.
[Article]
Scientific Realism and Components: The Case of Classical Astronomy
The Monist 77:1,
(1994).
pp. 111–127.
[Article]
When Would Natural Laws Have Been Broken?
Analysis 53:4,
(1993).
pp. 262–269.
Shared top prize awarded in Analysis Annual Essay Competition.
[Article]
Lawlikeness
Noûs 27,
(1993).
pp. 1–21.
[Article]
Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos
Erkenntnis 38,
(1993).
pp. 233-248.
Reprinted in John Carroll (ed.), Readings on Laws of Nature Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, (2004) pp. 161–175. reprinted in Alexander Bird and James Ladyman (eds.) Arguing About Science Abington, UK: Routledge (2013) pp. 455–465.
[Article]
Armstrong and Dretske on the Explanatory Power of Regularities
Analysis 52:3,
(1992).
pp. 154–159.
[Article]
Hui Shih’s Logical Theory of Descriptions: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Hui Shih’s Ten Enigmatic Arguments
Monumenta Serica 38,
(1989).
pp. 95–114.
[Article]
Invited Pieces
Book chapters, prefaces, articles, and encyclopedia entries
It Takes More Than All Kinds to Make a World
in Joseph Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew Slater (eds.),
Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science,
Cambridge: Bradford/MIT Press,
(2025).
pp. 53–84.
[Article]
Against the Levels Picture
in Jeremy Koons (ed.),
The Sellarsian Mind,
Routledge,
(2025).
Forthcoming.
Genetic Drift
ed. James Mattingly, article in,
The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM),
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE,
(2025).
Forthcoming.
[Article]
Mathematical Explanations
article in,
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Taylor and Francis,
(2023).
doi:10.4324/9780415249126-Q145-1.
[Article]
Laws
in Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson (eds.),
Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics,
New York: Routledge,
(2022).
[Article]
Bolzano, the Parallelogram of Forces, and Scientific Explanation
in Stefan Roski and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.),
Bolzano’s Philosophy of Grounding,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2022).
pp. 394–417.
[Article]
What is a Law of Nature?
Aeon,
(2022).
[Article]
Laws of Nature, Natural Necessity, and Counterfactual Conditionals
in Otavio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski (eds.),
Routledge Handbook of Modality,
Abingdon, UK: Routledge,
(2021).
pp. 230–239.
[Article]
Replies to Heron and Knox, Morrison, and Strevens
contribution to a symposium on Because Without Cause in,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99,
(2019).
pp. 739–748.
[Article]
Precis of Because Without Cause
in,
Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science,
(2019).
pp. 714–719.
[Article]
What Would Reasons For Trusting Science Be?
Commentary on Tanner Lectures on Human Values in,
Naomi Oreskes, Why Trust Science?,
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
(2019).
pp. 181–190.
[Article]
Reply to my Critics: On Explanations by Constraint
contribution to a symposium on Because Without Cause in,
Metascience 27:1,
(2018).
pp. 27–36.
[Article]
[PDF]
How the Explanations of Natural Laws Make Some Reducible Physical Properties Natural and Explanatorily Potent
in Walter Ott and Lydia Patton (eds.),
Laws of Nature,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2018).
pp. 181–204.
[Article]
Because Without Cause: Scientific Explanations by Constraint
in Alexander Reutlinger and Jusa Saatsi (eds.),
Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2018).
pp. 15–38.
[Article]
Idealism and Incommensurability
in Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.),
Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2017).
pp. 259–274.
[Article]
Preface to Cambridge Philosophical Classics
reissue of D.M. Armstrong,
What Is a Law of Nature?,
Cambridge University Press,
(2016).
How are Mental Illnesses Different?
in Gary Gala and Daniel Moseley (eds.),
Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives,
New York and London: Routledge,
(2015).
pp. 36–51.
[Article]
Laws of Nature
in Lawrence Sklar (ed.),
Physical Theory: Method and Interpretation,
New York: Oxford University Press,
(2015).
pp. 63–93.
[Article]
[PDF]
Laws of Nature
in Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos (eds.),
Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, 2nd ed.,
New York: Routledge,
(2014).
pp. 235–244.
[Article]
[PDF]
How to Explain the Lorentz Transformations
in Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby (eds.),
Metaphysics and Science (Mind Association Occasional Series),
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2013).
pp. 73–98.
[Article]
What Would Natural Laws in the Life Sciences Be?
in Kostas Kampourakis (ed.),
The Philosophy of Biology: A Companion for Educators,
Dordrecht: Springer,
(2013).
pp. 67–86.
[Article]
Are Some Things Naturally Necessary?
in Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.),
The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?,
Routledge Studies in Metaphysics, New York: Routledge,
(2013).
pp. 235-251.
[Article]
There Sweep Great General Principles Which All the Laws Seem to Follow
in Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman (eds.),
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2012).
pp. 154-185.
[Article]
Laws of Nature
in Duncan Prichard (ed.),
Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy,
New York: Oxford University Press,
(2012).
[Article]
Replies to my Critics
contribution to a symposium on Laws and Lawmakers, in,
Metascience 20,
(2011).
pp. 45-52.
[Article]
Hume and the Problem of Induction
in Dov Gabbay, Stephen Hartmann, and John Woods (eds.),
Handbook of the History of Logic, volume 10: Inductive Logic,
Amsterdam: Elsevier/North Holland,
(2011).
pp. 43–92.
[Article]
Causation in Classical Mechanics
in Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies (eds.),
Oxford Handbook of Causation,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2009).
pp. 649–660.
[Article]
Why do the Laws Explain Why?
in Toby Handfield (ed.),
Dispositions and Causes,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(2009).
pp. 286–321.
[Article]
Scientific Inquiry
in John Shand (ed.),
Central Issues of Philosophy,
Malden, MA: Blackwell,
(2009).
pp. 177–192.
[Article]
Laws of Nature
in Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos (eds.),
Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science,
New York: Routledge,
(2008).
pp. 203–212.
Laws and Theories
in Sahotra Sarkar and Anya Plutynski (eds.),
A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology,
Malden, MA: Blackwell,
(2008).
pp. 489–505.
[Article]
Philosophy of Classical Mechanics
in Donald Borchert (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition,
Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA,
(2006).
volume 2, pp. 279–284.
[Article]
Energy and Force
in Donald Borchert (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition,
Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA,
(2006).
volume 2, pp. 279–284. volume 3, pp. 234–237.
[Article]
Scientific Laws
in Donald Borchert (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition,
Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA,
(2006).
volume 5, pp. 220–225.
[Article]
Books Edited
Philosophy of Science: An Anthology
Malden, MA: Blackwell,
(2007).
hardcover and paperback.
[Article]
Other Articles
Is ‘Artificial Life’ Alive?
in,
Artificial Life, catalogue for exhibition at Consolidated Works, a Seattle contemporary arts center,,
(1999).
Can Science Answer Moral Questions?
L. Reynolds (ed.) and L. Lieberman, in,
Race and Other Misadventures,
Dix Hills, New York: General Hall,
(1996).
pp. 378–396.
Book Reviews
For Crying Out Loud
Critical Notice of “Calling for Explanation” by Dan Baras,
Analysis 83,
Oxford University Press,
(2025).
pp. 604–616.
[Article]
Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
contribution to book symposium,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91,
(2015).
pp. 508–515.
Review of “Causal Reasoning in Physics” by Mathias Frisch, Cambridge University Press (2014) American Journal of Physics 83(2015): 477.
[Article]
“Abstraction and Depth in Scientific Explanation” – contribution to book symposium on Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation
by Michael Strevens,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84,
(2012).
pp. 483–491.
[Article]
Review of “Nature’s Metaphysics”
by Alexander Bird,
Philosophical Review, 119(1),
(2010).
pp. 97–99.
Structuralism with an Empiricist Face?
contribution (in Italian) to a debate on Bas van Fraassen, "Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective",
Iride: Filosofia E Discussione Pubblica (Bologna), 58,
(2009).
pp. 713-17.
Reprinted (in English) in IRIS. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 2 (April 2010), pp. 252–256.
[Article]
Review of “The Metaphysics Within Physics”
by Tim Maudlin,
Mind 118,
(2009).
pp. 197–200.
[Article]
Review of “Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited”
Huw Price and Richard Corry (eds.),
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,
(2007).
[Article]
Farewell to Laws of Nature?
essay review of “Laws in Nature” by Stephen Mumford,
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A37,
(2006).
pp. 361–369.
[Article]
Review of “Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science”
by Peter Godfrey-Smith,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83,
(2005).
pp. 122–124.
Review Essay on “Dynamics of Reason”
by Michael Friedman,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68,
(2004).
pp. 702–712.
[Article]
Review of “Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth”
by Stathis Psillos,
Philosophical Books 42: 4,
(2001).
pp. 317–320.
[Article]
Review of “Laws of Nature”
by John Carroll,
Philosophical Quarterly 47,
(1997).
pp. 526–529.