Marc is the author of the blockbuster bestseller Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature (Oxford, 2009), which is soon to be a major motion picture. More recently, he has written the iridescently lyrical “Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics” (Oxford, 2016). Earlier he wrote the gripping page-turner An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy, and Mass (Blackwell, 2002) and the steamy, heart-rending Natural Laws in Scientific Practice (Oxford, 2000). Some of his most compelling recent papers are the exhilarating romp “The Most Famous Equation,” The Journal of Philosophy (2001);  the thrilling “Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions, and the Turnover Fallacy,” Analysis (2002); the ominous “Who’s Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them,” Erkenntnis (2002); the suspenseful, flamboyant “Would Direct Realism Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?”, Noûs (2004); the madcap “Ecological Laws: What Would They Be and Why Would They Matter?,” Oikos [The Journal of the Nordic Ecological Society] (2005);  the momentous “How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill Its Causal Role?” Philosophical Review (2005); the rousing “A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity,” Philosophical Studies (2005); the tenderly ironic “How to Account for the Relation Between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws,”Mind (2006); the poignant “Laws and Meta-Laws of Nature: Conservation Laws and Symmetries,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics (2007); the heart-stopping “Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make”, Analysis (2008); the wistful, Proustian “Could the Laws of Nature Change?”, Philosophy of Science (2008); the raw, touching “Why Proofs by Mathematical Induction are Generally Not Explanatory”, Analysis (2009); the rollicking “Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics Be Complete?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2009); the scintillating “Dimensional Explanations”, Noûs (2009); the epic “What are Mathematical Coincidences (and Why Does It Matter)?,” Mind (2010); the high-wire act of storytelling “A Tale of Two Vectors,” Dialectica (2009); the elemental and evocative “Conservation Laws in Scientific Explanations: Constraints or Coincidences?” Philosophy of Science (2011); the at once realistic and phantasmagorical “‘There Sweep Great General Principles Which All the Laws Seem To Follow’,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2012); the ripsnortingly rhetorical “Did Einstein Really Believe that Principle Theories are Explanatorily Powerless?”, Perspectives on Science (2014); the sober yet tumultuous “Really Statistical Explanations and Genetic Drift“, Philosophy of Science(2013); the by turns cosmic and gritty “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2013); the up-tempo but deeply felt “Depth and Explanation in Mathematics,” Philosophia Mathematica (2014); the taut and bewitching “Aspects of Mathematical Explanation: Symmetry, Unity, and Salience” (2014); the unflinching and bittersweet “Explanation, Existence, and Natural Properties in Mathematics – A Case Study: Desargues Theorem“, Dialectica (2015); the relentless yet pixielike “Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle? (No.),” The Monist (2017); the searingly honest and pleasantly humid “Reply to my critics: On explanations by constraint” (for a symposium on my book, Because Without Cause), Metascience (2018); the astonishing and sucker-punch tragic “Transitivity, Self-Explanation, and the Circularity Argument against Humean Accounts of Natural Law,” Synthese (2018); the positive instance of Betteridge’s Law of Headlines “What Would Normative Necessity Be?”, The Journal of Philosophy (2018); the potent and harrowing “Mathematical Explanations That Are Not Proofs”, Erkenntnis (2018); the joyous and inevitable “Are There both Causal and Non-Causal Explanations of a Rocket’s Acceleration?,” Perspectives on Science (2019); the hurtling, adamant, and operatic “The Principle of Virtual Work, Counterfactuals, and the Avoidance of Physics,” European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2019); the literally unputdownable “Ground and Explanation in Mathematics,” Philosophers’ Imprint (2019); the essential summer-read “What Inference to the Best Explanation is Not: A Reply to Roche and Sober’s Screening-Off Challenge to IBE,” Teorema (2020); the brittle, heat-struck, ferocious “Asymmetries as a Challenge to Counterfactual Accounts of Non-Causal Explanation,” Synthese (2021); the necessary and sometimes powerful “What Could Mathematics Be for it to Function in Distinctively Mathematical Scientific Explanations?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2021); the convivial but spring-loaded “Inference to the Best Explanation is an Important Form of Reasoning in Mathematics,” The Mathematical Intelligencer (2021); the buttinskian yet dill-scented “Challenges Facing Counterfactual Accounts of Explanation in Mathematics” Philosophia Mathematica (2022); the incendiary, raucous, lurid “Putting Explanation Back Into ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’,”Noûs (2022); the rhapsodic, melancholic, and wicked “A New Circularity in Explanations by Humean Laws of Nature,” Philosophical Studies (2023); the pulse-pounding “How to Make the World Safe for Autonomy; or, How to Fodor-Kitcher an Albert-Loewer,” in Rethinking the Concept of Law of Nature (2022); the dangerous household item “In Defense of Really Statistical Explanations,” Synthese (2022); the crinkum-crankum-filled “Against Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Quality,” Philosophy of Science (2022); the urgent and ultimately uplifting “Inference to the Best Explanation as Supporting the Expansion of Mathematicians’ Ontological Commitments,” Synthese (2022); the fugitive, volatile “Running it up the Flagpole to see if Anyone Salutes: A Response to Woodward on Causal and Explanatory Asymmetries” (with Katie Elliott), Theoria (2022); the necessary and sometimes powerful “Explanation by Constraint: Not Just in Physics,” International Journal in the Philosophy of Science (2023); the nautilus-shaped “A New Circularity in Explanations by Humean Laws of Nature,” Philosophical Studies (2023); the Taylor-Swift-meets-Roosterhead-McGinty “How Simplicity Can Be A Virtue in Philosophical Theory-Choice,” Erkenntnis (2024); the droll and desolate “A False Dichotomy in Denying Explanatoriness Any Role in Confirmation,” Noûs (2024); the oceanic “What Are Explanatory Proofs In Mathematics and How Can They Contribute to Teaching and Learning?,” The Journal of Mathematical Behavior (2024); the jaunty and haunting “Inference to the Best Explanation as a Form of Non-Deductive Reasoning in Mathematics,” Philosophia Mathematica (2025); and the hydra-headed, breathless, incantatory “The End of Diseases,” Philosophical Topics (2007). (Forthcoming luminous papers available upon request.)